This paper explains the empirical phenomenon of persistent "…fty-…fty" probability judgments through a model of Bayesian updating under ambiguity. To this purpose I characterize an announced probability judgment as a Bayesian estimate given as the solution to a Choquet expected utility maximization problem with respect to a neo-additive capacity that has been updated in accordance with the Generalized Bayesian update rule. Only for the non-generic case, in which this capacity degenerates to an additive probability measure, the agent will learn the event's true probability if the number of i.i.d. data observations gets large. In contrast, for the generic case in which the capacity is not additive, the agent's announced probability judgment becomes a persistent "…fty-…fty" probability judgment after …nitely many observations.
Introduction

Motivation
Let us consider two opposite benchmark cases of how agents form and revise probability judgments. On the one hand, there is the statistically sophisticated agent whose probability judgments are described by additive Bayesian estimates that are updated in accordance with Bayes' rule. On the other hand, there is the statistically ignorant agent who attaches a …fty percent chance to any uncertain event whereby he sticks to this probability judgment regardless of any new information. More precisely, I speak of a "…fty-…fty" probability judgment if for any given pair of uncertain complementary events A; :A the agent announces that either event occurs with 0:5 probability.
The persistence of such "…fty-…fty"probability judgments are well-documented within the literature on focal point answers in economic surveys (Hurd 2009; Kleinjans and Van Soest 2010; Manski and Molinari 2010; van Santen et al. 2012) as well as within the psychological literature (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2000; Wakker 2004; Camerer 2007) . Wakker (2010) interprets "…fty-…fty" judgments as an extreme case of cognitive likelihood insensitivity; more speci…cally, he writes: "Likelihood insensitivity can be related to regression to the mean. It is not a statistical artifact resulting from data analysis with noise, though, but it is a psychological phenomenon, describing how people perceive and weight probabilities in decisions. In weighting probabilities, a regression to the mean takes place, with people failing to discriminate su¢ ciently between intermediate probabilities and taking them all too much as the same ("50-50", "don't know")."(p. 228).
Given that likelihood insensitivity corresponds, in theory, to a very large domain of possible probability judgments, the question arises why "…fty-…fty" judgments are the predominant empirical expression of likelihood insensitivity. This paper proposes a decision theoretic explanation of this "…fty-…fty" phenomenon. To this purpose I construct a model of Bayesian estimation under ambiguity which I combine with a Bayesian learning model such that the agent can observe i.i.d. statistical trials whose outcomes are either A or :A. The resulting model of Bayesian learning under ambiguity turns out to encompass the announced probability judgments of sophisticated agents as the non-generic and the announced probability judgments of ignorant agents as the generic case.
Formally, my model is based on the assumption that decision makers are Choquet expected utility (=CEU) rather than expected utility (=EU) maximizers. Behavioral axioms that generalize EU to CEU theory were …rst presented in Schmeidler (1989) within the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, which assumes preferences over objective probability distributions. Subsequently, Gilboa (1987) as well as Sarin and Wakker (1992) have presented behavioral CEU axiomatizations within the purely subjective Savage (1954) framework.
From a mathematical perspective, CEU theory is an application of fuzzy measure theory such that the integration with respect to a fuzzy (=non-additive) probability measure is characterized by a comonotonic, positive homogeneous and monotonic functional (cf., Schmeidler 1986; Grabisch et al. 1995; Sugeno 1989, 1991; Narukawa and Murofushi 2003, 2004; Sugeno et al. 1998; Narukawa et al. 2000 Narukawa et al. , 2001 Narukawa 2007) .
From the perspective of behavioral decision theory, CEU theory is formally equivalent to cumulative prospect theory (=CPT) (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Wakker and Tversky 1993; Basili and Chateauneuf 2011) whenever CPT is restricted to gains. CPT, in turn, extends the celebrated concept of original prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to the case of several possible gain values in a way that satis…es …rst-order stochastic dominance. Because my formal approach thus admits for an interpretation in terms of behavioral axioms (Gilboa 1987; Chateauneuf et al. 2007; , it contributes towards "opening the black box of decision makers instead of modifying functional forms" (Rubinstein 2003 (Rubinstein , p. 1207 ).
The set-up
My point of departure is the formal description of announced probability judgments about some family of complementary events A; :A whereby the agent can observe the outcome of statistical trials resulting each time in the occurrence of either A or :A. To …x ideas consider the following illustrative example.
Example. Suppose that the agent knows the total (large) number of balls in a given urn as well as the fact that each ball has some color y, with y 2 fblue; red; greeng, but that he has no information whatsoever about the proportions of di¤erently colored balls within this urn. A state ! 0 2 0 stands for the fact that a speci…c ball is drawn. Fix some color y and de…ne A A y as the event that a ball of color y will be drawn. In a next step, we allow the agent to observe statistical trials according to which balls are drawn from this urn and put back after their color has been revealed to the agent. Assume that these trials are i.i.d. such that, for example, the "true" probability 2 (0; 1) of A y corresponds to the actual proportion of y-colored balls in the urn. If the agent is an ignorant agent in our sense, he will announce after …nitely many observations that the chance of drawing versus not-drawing a ball of color y is "…fty-…fty". Now we can switch to a di¤erent color and we will observe the same "…fty-…fty" judgment after su¢ ciently many statistical trials. That is, the ignorant agent in our sense will eventually attach a …fty-…fty chance to all complementary event pairs A y ; :A y with y 2 fblue; red; greeng.
More generally, consider the measurable space ( 0 ; A 0 ) and …x some event A 2 A 0 such that (i) 2 (0; 1) denotes the true probability of A and (ii) the agent deems it impossible that A might have probability one or zero. Let A = f;; A; :A; 0 g. The agent's probability judgments will then apply to some family of "binary" measurable spaces f(
Fix an arbitrary ( 0 ; A) and construct the measurable space ( ; F) as follows. De…ne the state space = I
with generic element ! ( ; i). The parameter space = (0; 1) collects all possible probabilities of event A.
1 Endow with the Euclidean metric and denote by B the corresponding Borel -algebra on . The information space I is given as the in…nite sample space
such that, for all j, S j = fA; :Ag .
S j collects the possible outcomes of the j-th statistical trial according to which either A or :A occurs. De…ne I as the standard product algebra of (A) 1 j=1 , i.e., the -algebra generated by the sets in 1 j=1 B j j B j 2 A such that B j 6 = 0 for …nitely many B j .
Consequently, the agent will always only receive a …nite amount of sample information. The relevant event space F is then de…ned as the standard product algebra of B and I.
1 In line with the assumption that the agent deems it impossible that A has probability one or zero, I consider = (0; 1) rather than = [0; 1]. Mathematically, the restriction to = (0; 1) also has the advantage that I do not have to consider degenerate measures which put all probability mass on 0 or 1. (For example, for such measures Bayesian updating is not well-de…ned for all possible sample observations. Also see footnote 7.) I assume that the agent is a Choquet Bayesian decision maker in the sense that his beliefs are characterized by (i) a unique-not necessarily additive-subjective probability measure on ( ; F) and (ii) that he forms conditional-not necessarily additiveprobability measures in accordance with some Bayesian update rule for CEU decision makers (see Section 2.2 for details).
2 More speci…cally, let us focus thoughts and assume that the agent's subjective probability measure is pinned down by his CEU preferences over Savage acts de…ned on the state space . Recall that a Savage act f maps the state space into some set of consequences, i.e., f : ! Z, whereby I assume throughout the paper that Z = [0; 1]. For a given constant x 2 (0; 1) de…ne the F-measurable Savage act f x : ! [0; 1] such that f x ( ; i) = jx j. I interpret f x as the Savage act that corresponds to the probability judgment x whereby the consequence of f x in state ( ; i) is given as the Euclidean distance between the agent's probability judgment x and the true probability .
An announced probability judgment x is then formally characterized by the preference maximizing act f x over all f x , x 2 (0; 1). Through an announced probability judgment the agent thus expresses his probabilistic forecast about the occurrence of an uncertain event such as, e.g., tomorrow's weather conditions, next year's economic growth, or whether the agent will die at age y 2 f65; :::100g.
In the remainder of this introduction I describe this preference maximization problem, at …rst, for the special case of a standard expected utility and, afterwards, for the general case of a Choquet expected utility maximizer.
The standard approach: Expected utility decision makers
Consider at …rst the special case of a CEU decision maker who reduces to a standard expected utility (=EU) decision maker. To focus thoughts let us assume that this EU decision maker is a subjective EU maximizer with preferences over Savage acts on that satisfy Savage's (1954) axioms. For this EU decision maker there exists a bounded utility function u : Z [0; 1] ! R, unique up to a positive linear transformation, and a unique additive probability measure on ( ; F) such that for all Savage acts f x ; f y , x; y 2 (0; 1):
where~ ( ; i) = denotes the F-measurable random variable that gives for every state ( ; i) of the world the true probability 2 (0; 1) and E denotes the expectation operator with respect to ~ .
denote some sample information in F. Denote by I an ex post preference ordering which we interpret as the agent's preferences over Savage acts after he has learnt information I. If the agent updates his preferences to I in the standard Bayesian way, we obtain for an EU decision maker that, for all Savage acts f x ; f y , x; y 2 (0; 1):
where
for B 2 fB 0 I j B 0 2 Bg. The solution to the EU maximization problem
stands for this EU decision maker's announced probability judgment in the light of sample information I.
Observe that the announced probability judgment (9) is the standard estimate of Bayesian statistics which minimizes the expectation of some loss function l = u, de…ned over absolute errors, with respect to some posterior distribution (cf., e.g., Berger 1980) . For example, if the loss function is quadratic, i.e.,
it can be shown (cf. Section 3) that (9) becomes
That is, under the assumption of a negative quadratic utility function the EU agent's announced probability judgment x I coincides with the classical Bayesian estimate given as the expected parameter value with respect to the posterior distribution ~ j I (cf., Girshick and Savage 1951; James and Stein 1961; Section 35 in Billingsley 1995) .
The example revisited for a negative quadratic utility function. Fix some color y 2 fblue; red; greeng and suppose that ~ corresponds to a Beta distribution over (0; 1) with parameters ; > 0 so that, prior to any sample information, the agent's announced probability judgment (11) about drawing an y-colored ball, i.e., event A y , is given as
Denote by I I k n the sample information according to which k balls of color y have been drawn in n (Bernoulli) trials. It can be easily shown (cf. Zimper 2011 and references therein) that the posterior distribution
is itself a Beta distribution with parameters +k; +n k so that the agent's announced probability judgment (11) in the light of sample information
Observe that the probability judgment (15) is a convex combination between the agent's prior probability judgment, E h~ ; ~ i , and the observed proportion of drawn balls of color y, k n , whereby the agent will attach an increasing weight to this observed proportion when the number of trials increases. By the law of large numbers, this EU maximizing agent's probability judgment will thus converge with certainty to the true probability of event A y . Since this convergence result holds, by Doob's (1949) consistency theorem, for EU maximizing agents under fairly general conditions (see Section 4), the probability judgments of an ignorant agent in our sense cannot be modeled as the Bayesian estimates of an EU decision maker.
My approach: Choquet expected utility decision makers
As this paper's main conceptual contribution, I generalize the standard model (9) of Bayesian estimation to a model of Choquet Bayesian estimation. To focus thoughts suppose that the agent satis…es Gilboa's (1987) CEU axioms on preferences over Savage acts on so that there exists a bounded utility function u : Z [0; 1] ! R, unique up to a positive linear transformation, and a unique non-additive probability measure on ( ; F) such that for all Savage acts f x ; f y , x; y 2 (0; 1):
where E C denotes the Choquet expectation operator with respect to (see Section 2 for formal de…nitions). Furthermore, if the agent updates his preferences to I in accordance with the Generalized Bayesian update rule (Pires 2002; Eichberger et al. 2007; Siniscalchi 2011) , we obtain for an CEU decision maker that, for all Savage acts f x ; f y , x; y 2 (0; 1):
for B 2 fB 0 I j B 0 2 Bg. I refer to the solution of the CEU maximization problem
as the CEU decision maker's announced probability judgment in the light of sample information I. Alternatively, I call (19) the Choquet Bayesian estimate with respect to ~ j I .
If reduces to an additive measure , the Choquet Bayesian estimate (19) becomes (9) so that standard Bayesian estimation is nested within Choquet Bayesian estimation. If is not additive, the CEU maximization problem (19) does, in general, not allow for an analytically convenient solution. In contrast to the additive expectation operator E in (9), the Choquet expectation operator E C is non-linear and, while being continuous, it is no longer di¤erentiable everywhere. Unlike the global maximum of (9), the global maximum of (19) is, for strictly concave and di¤erentiable u, therefore no longer characterized by a …rst-order condition.
To simplify the maximization problem (19), I am going to restrict attention to non-additive probability measures described as neo-additive capacities in the sense of Chateauneuf et al. (2007) . Neo-additive capacities reduce the potential complexity of non-additive probability measures in a very parsimonious way (i.e., two additional parameters only) such that important empirical features (e.g., inversely S-shaped probability transformation functions) are portrayed (cf. Chapter 11 in Wakker 2010).
As a …rst formal result (Lemma), I comprehensively characterize the solution to the CEU maximization problem (19) for strictly concave and di¤erentiable utility functions and neo-additive capacities. In a next step, I study a model of Bayesian learning in which the agent can observe i.i.d. sample information generated by the true probability of event A. For the non-generic case in which the neo-additive capacity reduces to an additive probability measure, the agent's announced probability judgment converges, by Doob's (1949) consistency theorem, to the event A's true probability. As this paper's main formal result (Theorem), I prove:
For the generic case in which the neo-additive capacity is not additive, the agent's announced probability judgment about any events A; :A becomes a "…fty-…fty" judgment after …nitely many data observations.
The remainder of the analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 recalls concepts from Choquet decision theory. Section 3 presents the analytical solution to the Choquet Bayesian estimation problem. The Bayesian learning model is constructed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Preliminaries 2.1 Non-additive probability measures and Choquet integration
Fix the measurable space ( ; F) and a set of null events
(ii) (B) = 1 for B such that nB 2 N , (iii) (B) (C) for B; C such that B C. For reasons of analytical tractability we focus on non-additive probability measures de…ned as neo-additive capacities (Chateauneuf et al. 2007 ).
De…nition. Fix some parameters ; 2 [0; 1]. A neo-additive capacity :
for all B 2 F such that is some additive probability measure satisfying
and the non-additive probability measure is de…ned as follows
I call an event B 2 F essential if and only if B = 2 N and nB = 2 N . Throughout this paper I restrict attention to sets of null-events N such that B 2 N i¤ (B) = 0. Consequently, B is essential if and only if 0 < (B) < 1. Observe that the neo-additive capacity (20) simpli…es to
for essential B. The parameter is interpreted as an ambiguity or insensitivity parameter whereas the value of determines whether (B) overestimates (i.e., > (B)) or underestimates (i.e., < (B)) the additive probability (B) whenever > 0.
The Choquet integral of a bounded F-measurable function w : ! R with respect to capacity is de…ned as the following Riemann integral extended to domain (Schmeidler 1986 ):
(24) For instance, if w takes on m di¤erent values such that B 1 ; :::; B m is the unique partition of with w (! 1 ) > ::: > w (! m ) for ! i 2 A i , the Choquet expectation (24) becomes
A formal proof of the following Observation can be found for …nite valued w in Chateauneuf et al. (2007) and for bounded w in Zimper (2012) .
Observation 1. Let w : ! R be an F-measurable function with bounded range. The Choquet expected value (24) of w with respect to a neo-additive capacity (20) is given as
2.2 Conditional non-additive probability measures CEU theory generalizes EU theory in order to accommodate paradoxes of the Ellsberg (1961) type which show that real-life decision makers violate Savage's sure thing principle. Because CEU relaxes the sure thing principle, there exist several alternative Bayesian update rules for CEU decision makers which correspond to alternative de…ni-tions of conditional non-additive probability measures. The existing literature foremostly focuses on conditional non-additive probability measures derived from the optimistic (=naive), the pessimistic (=Dempster-Shafer), or the Generalized (=full) Bayesian update rule (cf. Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Sarin and Wakker 1998; Pires 2002; Eichberger, Grant, Kelsey 2007 , 2010 Eichberger, Grant, Lefort 2009; Zimper and Ludwig 2009; Siniscalchi 2011; Zimper 2012) . In what follows I brie ‡y sketch why the relaxation of the sure thing principle gives rise to alternative de…nitions of conditional non-additive probability measures.
3
Ex ante preferences over Savage acts, denoted , are interpreted as the decision maker's preferences before he receives any information. In contrast, ex post preferences over Savage acts, denoted I , are interpreted as preferences conditional on information I, i.e., after the decision maker has observed the occurrence of some non-null event I 2 F. A Bayesian update rule speci…es how ex post preferences I over Savage acts are derived from ex ante preferences for all essential I 2 F. De…ne the following Savage act
and recall the de…nition of Savage's (1954) sure thing principle:
De…nition: Sure thing principle. For all Savage acts f; g; h; h 0 and all I 2 F, the following condition holds for ex ante preferences:
If the sure thing principle (28) holds, then there exists one plausible Bayesian update rule; namely, for all f; g; h and all I,
In words: If the decision maker prefers the consequences of f on I to the consequences of g on I given that f and g have common consequences on :I, then the decision maker should also prefer f to g after he has learnt that I has occurred. Under the assumption of Savage's (1954) axioms for and I , the update rule (29) gives rise to the familiar de…nition of a conditional additive probability measure (8). CEU preferences that do not reduce to EU preferences, however, violate the sure thing principle to the e¤ect that there exist f; g and I such that
Since any in-depth discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of the present paper, I would like to refer the interested reader to the mentioned literature.
for some h and h 0 with h 6 = h 0 . Fix h and h 0 in (30) and observe that there exist two alternative ways of deriving ex post preferences I over f and g from (30); namely, either
or
That is, if the sure principle does not hold, there exist several alternative Bayesian update rules in the sense that we can associate, for …xed f; g, with every I 2 F an act h (I) such that
The Generalized Bayesian update rule
In the present paper I restrict attention to the Generalized Bayesian update rule, which appears to perform well in empirical investigations (Cohen at al. 2000) and which is popular in the literature because it avoids the extreme updating behavior of alternative update rules. More speci…cally, the Generalized Bayesian update rule de…nes h (I) in (33) as the ( I )-conditional certainty equivalent of g; that is, h (I) is the constant act such that g I h (I) as well as h (I) I g. Eichberger et al. (2007) prove that the Generalized Bayesian update rule gives rise to a conditional non-additive probability measure given as (18). A formal proof of the following result appears in Zimper and Ludwig (2009) and in Eichberger et al. (2010) .
Observation 2. An application of the Generalized Bayesian update rule (18) to a neoadditive capacity (20) results in the following conditional neo-additive capacity
for essential B 2 F and non-null I 2 F, whereby
By Observation 2, an application of the Generalized Bayesian update rule to a neoadditive capacity results in a conditional neo-additive capacity for which the ambiguity parameter has changed from to I whereas the parameter remains unchanged. As a consequence, the Generalized Bayesian update rule is formally very convenient because it reduces the Bayesian updating dynamics of neo-additive capacities to additive Bayesian updating plus the updating of the ambiguity parameter. In particular, we have that I > whereby smaller additive probabilities of the observed information, (I), imply a greater updated ambiguity parameter I . If we interpret the ambiguity parameter as the agent's lack of con…dence in the additive probability measure , the formal relationship (35) implies that the agent's con…dence will further decrease if he observes unlikely information.
Although this interpretation of (35) has intuitive appeal, it also implies that more and more sample information will increase the ambiguity parameter. This is because in a Bayesian framework any speci…c realization of large sample information is rather unlikely from an ex ante perspective and it will be the more unlikely the larger the sample is. The fact that ambiguity increases by (35) with more information will drive the Theorem in Section 4 where I consider a Bayesian learner who can observe large data samples.
Choquet Bayesian estimation
Consider a Savage act f x : ! [0; 1] such that, for all ( ; i) 2 ,
whereby I interpret x 2 (0; 1) as the decision maker's probability judgment associated with act f x . The consequence of f x in state ( ; i) is thus de…ned as the Euclidean distance between the true probability and the probability judgment x. To evaluate probability judgments I consider a bounded utility function u : [0; 1] ! R which is strictly concave and strictly decreasing whereby I normalize u (0) = 0. 4 Furthermore, I assume that
is continuously di¤erentiable in x as well as measurable with respect to~ ( ; i) = . For the …rst order derivative of u it holds that
That is, I assume that the maximum of u (j xj) at = x is conveniently characterized by the …rst order condition (=FOC). 4 A strictly concave u corresponds to the standard case of strictly risk averse decision makers. Interpreted in terms of the loss function l = u of Bayesian estimation, strict concavity of u (i.e., strict convexity of l) implies that large di¤erences between the probability judgment and the true probability are over-proportionally penalized.
Fix some information I = I 0 2 F where I 0 2 I and consider the conditional neo-additive capacity space ( ; F; ( j I)) such that ( j I) is given by (34). By Observation 1, the CEU of the probability judgment x is given as
The best probability judgment a decision maker could come up with is to correctly announce the true probability, i.e., x = , implying
The worst possible probability judgment corresponds to the maximal Euclidean distance between the true probability and the announced probability x, implying
The best case scenario (40) corresponds to a benevolent nature which always picks a state that coincides with the agent's probability judgment thereby maximizing his utility. In contrast, the worst case scenario (41) corresponds to a malevolent nature which always picks a state that minimizes the agent's utility for his probability judgment. The ambiguity parameter I in (39) determines how much the agent cares about the best and worst case scenario as compared to his additive (=non-ambiguous) expectation. The parameter in (39) determines the degree by which the agent resolves his ambiguity by focusing on the best case versus the worst case scenario. Collecting terms gives us the following characterization of the agent's CEU function (39) for any probability judgment x.
Observation 3. Let
with I given by (35). The agent's objective function is then given as
Observe that the term for the best case scenario (40) vanishes from the agent's maximization problem. The reason is straightforward: Whatever probability judgment the agent chooses, in the best case scenario a benevolent nature plays along to ensure that the agent achieves his maximal utility. In contrast, the worst case scenario (41), in which a malevolent nature plays against the agent, enters the agent's maximization problem. to the e¤ect that a simple FOC argument is not su¢ cient to characterize the solution to (44). To exclude the trivial case where (42) and (43) are constantly zero, I henceforth assume that either I < 1 or I = 1, < 1.
Lemma. De…ne x 1 and x 2 implicitly through the following FOCs
The solution x C I of the maximization problem (44), i.e.,
is characterized as follows.
(a) If
(c) If
To illustrate the …ndings of the Lemma let us consider the special case of a negative quadratic utility function, i.e., u (z) = z 2 . In that case, (42) and (43) become
and we can derive explicit analytical expressions for x 1 and x 2 . Namely, by (46),
as well as
,
The following corollary establishes that the classical point estimate of Bayesian statistics-given as the expected parameter value with respect to a posterior (additive) probability distribution-is nested in the solution of the Lemma whenever the neo-additive capacity reduces to an additive probability measure and u is given as the negative quadratic utility function.
Corollary. Suppose that u is given as the negative quadratic utility function, i.e., u (z) = z 2 .
(a) If = 0, the analytical solution (47) becomes
. Only if = 0, the analytical solution (47) becomes (64).
Choquet Bayesian Learning of Probability Judgments
This section combines the CEU estimation problem (47) with a standard model of Bayesian learning according to which the agent observes sample information that is generated by some i.i.d. process. More speci…cally, for a given measurable space ( 0 ; A) consider the additive probability space ( ; F; ) with ( ; F) de…ned in Subsection 1.1. Any possible sample information after n trials is given as some event I n = fs 1 g ::: fs n g S n+1 ::: 2 F
with s j 2 fA; :Ag, j = 1; :::; n. Suppose that the outcomes of the statistical trials are, conditional on , i.i.d. such that A occurs in every trial with true probability . That is,
such that
By Bayes'rule, we obtain the posterior ~ j I n such that, for any B 2 fB
Recall that Doob's (1949) consistency theorem 6 implies that, for almost all true parameter values belonging to the support of , the posterior distribution ~ j I n concentrates -almost everywhere (i.e., with ( j )-probability one) at the true value as n gets large; that is,
for all B 2 fB 0 I j B 0 2 Bg where 1 B 0 denotes the indicator function of the Borel set B 0 . Or, simply expressed,
Applied to the standard Bayesian estimate of an EU agent (47), we therefore obtain in the limit that
= (75) with ( j )-probability one. Consequently, Doob's theorem immediately implies the following convergence result.
Observation 4. Let ~ have full support on (0; 1). The EU agent's probability judgment about any essential event A 2 A will, for almost all , almost surely converge to A's true probability if the sample size n gets large, i.e.,
x In arg sup
By Observation 4, the probability judgment of an EU decision maker will converge through Bayesian learning towards the true probability of any given event A. Whenever (76) holds, I speak of a (statistically) sophisticated agent.
The situation is di¤erent for CEU decision makers. As in the EU benchmark case of Observation 4, I assume that the i.i.d. sample information I n is generated by , i.e., with true probability (I n j ). However, in contrast to the conditional additive probability measure ~ j I n given by (69), the CEU agent's Bayesian updating now results in the conditional neo-additive capacity
Consequently, the sophisticated agent of Observation 4 corresponds to the non-generic special case of an CEU agent for whom = 0.
The following Theorem states this paper's main result according to which the generic CEU agent becomes, already after …nitely many observations, a (statistically) ignorant agent whose announced probability judgment is given as a "…fty-…fty"judgment.
Theorem. For any 2 (0; 1] and 2 [0; 1), the agent's announced probability judgment about any complementary essential events A; :A 2 A becomes a …fty-…fty judgment for all ! 2 if the sample size n gets su¢ ciently large. That is, for any …xed 2 (0; 1] and 2 [0; 1) there exists some …nite number n 0 such that
for all n n 0 .
The formal proof of the Theorem is driven by the fact that the conditional ambiguity parameter converges towards one, i.e., lim n!1 In = 1, because the (additive) prior probability attached to this sample information converges towards zero, i.e., lim n!1 (I n ) = 0. As a consequence, we obtain for the limit of the objective function
with inf 2(0;1)
That is, in the limit the agent only cares about the worst case scenario in which a malevolent nature picks a true parameter value that minimizes his utility for any x he is going to choose. Since u is strictly decreasing on (0; 1), inf 2(0;1) u (f x ) takes on a maximum at the kink x = 1 2
. Observe that this limit argument implies that x
amounts to the best probability judgment against a malevolent nature regardless of the shape of u, i.e., regardless of the agent's risk attitudes, because there remains no (subjective) uncertainty in the limit. Beyond this limit argument, the formal proof of the Theorem uses the Lemma to show that x C In = 1 2 becomes already the announced probability judgment of strictly risk averse agents (i.e., u is strictly concave) if the number of observations n is su¢ ciently large.
Concluding Remarks
Referring to the "new psychological concept"of cognitive likelihood insensitivity, Peter Wakker (2010) demands that "new mathematical tools have to be developed to analyze this phenomenon"(p. 227). The present paper has done exactly that: Based on technical tools from fuzzy measure theory, the agent's probability judgments have been formally described as the solution to a CEU maximization problem subject to Bayesian learning of neo-additive capacities.
The main result establishes that all announced probability judgments become after …nitely many observations "…fty-…fty"judgments whenever the agent's neo-additive capacity is not given as an additive probability measure. This generic convergence result might thus contribute towards an explanation of why "…fty-…fty" judgments are the predominant empirical phenomenon of likelihood insensitivity. Interestingly, the CEU agent of our model announces his "…fty-…fty"probability judgment not due to a lack of statistical information but rather because he has received a large amount of information which increases his ambiguity parameter, i.e., his likelihood insensitivity.
Appendix: Formal Proofs
Proof of the Lemma. Step 1. Observe at …rst that
is locally uniformly integrably bounded because ~ j I is …nite and u (f x ) is continuously di¤erentiable in x and measurable in~ as well as bounded. Similarly, the continuous and~ -measurable partial derivative function
is locally uniformly integrably bounded with respect to ~ j I . As a consequence (cf.
Theorem 16.8 in Billingsley 1995) , (81) is continuously di¤erentiable in x whereby
Step 2. Focus on the function (42) and observe that it is, by assumption (45), strictly concave. Furthermore, (42) is, by (83), continuously di¤erentiable with
Evaluate (84) at x = 0, i.e.,
Since u 0 (1) < 0, we have, by assumption (45),
Furthermore, our assumptions on u and u 0 , in particular u 0 (0) = 0, imply
because u 0 ( ) < 0 for all 2 (0; 1). Combining (86) and (88) shows that
so that U 1 is strictly increasing at x = 0. Consequently,
implying that there exists a maximum x 1 of function (42) . That is, whenever x 1 2 0; 1 2 , x 1 is a local maximizer of the objective function (44).
Step 3. Turn now to the function (43), which is also strictly concave. (43) is continuously di¤erentiable with
Evaluated at x = 1, we have
because of u 0 (1) < 0 and u 0 (1 ) < 0 for all 2 (0; 1). That is, U 2 (x) is strictly decreasing at x = 1, implying 1 6 = arg sup
Consequently, there exists a maximum x 2 of function (43) on the interval 1 2
; 1 which is either x 2 1 2 characterized by the FOC (46) for i = 2 or given as the boundary solution
. That is, x 2 is a local maximizer of (44) i¤ x 2 2 1 2 ; 1 .
Step 4. If condition (48) holds, we have thus two local maximizers, x 1 and x 2 , of (44), characterized by FOCs (46), and whichever is greater is the global maximizer for (44). This proves (a).
Step 5 being the boundary maximum of (44) on the interval 1 2 ; 1 , x 1 is also the global maximizer for (44). This proves (b).
Step 6. If condition (52) holds, we have one local maximizer x 2 1 2 characterized by the FOC (46) for i = 2, which is also the global maximizer for (44). This proves (c).
Step 7. If condition (54) holds, there is no local maximizer characterized by any FOC. Instead (44) takes on its maximum at the kink x = 
by (45), implying x
Proof of the Theorem.
Step 1. Let
and observe that, for any I n = fs 1 g ::: fs n g 
because the sample observations are -conditionally independent. Since the fw n ( ) ( max ) n g n2N are non-negative measurable functions on (0; 1) decreasing in n pointwise to the constant function 0 whereby R 
7 Here the assumption that = (0; 1) instead of = [0; 1] is crucial. Otherwise pointwise convergence of w n ( ) to the zero function would break down at = 0 and = 1. For degenerate probability measures that put probability mass one on = 0 or = 1, we would then obtain that lim n!1 (I n ) > 0.
Step 2. Notice that (103) together with (35) implies lim n!1
In ! 1
for any I n .
Step 3. Consider at …rst the FOC (46) 
Step 4 
for all n. Taking the limit n ! 1 gives, by (104), u 0 (x 2;I1 ) = 0, -everywhere (111) because < 1 and E h d dx u f x 2;In ; ~ j I n i is bounded for all n. Consequently,
Step 5. Collecting (108) and (112) establishes that x 1;In converges to one whereas x 2;In converges to zero. By the de…nition of convergence in the Euclidean distance, there must thus exist some …nite n 0 such that for all n n 0 j1 x 1;In j < 1 2 and jx 2;In 0j < 1 2 , -everywhere.
Consequently, for all n n 0 , x 1;In > 1 2 and x 2;In < 1 2 , -everywhere (114) so that part (d) of the Lemma implies the desired result (78).
